An Efficient Security Mechanism for High-Integrity Wireless Sensor
  Networks by Sen, Jaydip
AN EFFICIENT SECURITY MECHANISM FOR HIGH-INTEGRITY 
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
 
 
Jaydip Sen 
Convergence Innovation Lab, Tata Consultancy Services  
Bengal Intelligence Park, M2 & N2, Sector- V, Block- GP, Salt Lake Electronics Complex, 
Kolkata-700091, INDIA. 
Email: jaydip.sen@tcs.com 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have recently 
attracted a lot of interest in the research community due 
their wide range of applications. Unfortunately, these 
networks are vulnerable to numerous security threats 
that can adversely affect their proper functioning. This 
problem is more critical if the network is deployed for 
some mission-critical applications such as in a tactical 
battlefield. Random failure of nodes and intentional 
compromise of nodes by an insider attack in a WSN 
pose particularly difficult challenges to security 
engineers as these attacks cannot be defended by 
traditional cryptography-based mechanisms. In this 
paper, a security solution is proposed for detecting 
compromised and faulty nodes in a WSN. The 
mechanism also isolates a compromised node from the 
network so that it cannot participate in any network 
activity. The proposed mechanism is based on 
misbehavior classification, behaviour monitoring and 
trust management. It involves minimum computation 
and communication overhead and is ideally suited for a 
resource-constrained, high-integrity WSN. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of hundreds 
or even thousands of small devices each with sensing, 
processing, and communication capabilities to monitor 
the real-world environment. They are envisioned to play 
an important role in a wide variety of areas ranging 
from critical military surveillance applications to forest 
fire monitoring and the building security monitoring in 
the near future. In these networks, a large number of 
sensor nodes are deployed to monitor a vast field, where 
the operational conditions are most often harsh or even 
hostile. To operate in such environments, these 
networks should be equipped with security mechanisms 
to defend against attacks such as node capture, physical 
tampering, eavesdropping, denial of service, etc [1, 27, 
28]. Security mechanisms deployed in these networks 
should involve collaborations among the nodes due to 
the decentralized nature and absence of infrastructure. 
Moreover, due to the large varieties of applications and 
diverse environmental conditions in which WSNs 
operate, it is necessary that security mechanisms are 
designed in context to the application domain. 
Therefore, the design of a secure WSN should consider 
the application-specific security context. Unfortunately, 
most of the currently existing WSN security solutions 
consider an abstract network model based on 
assumptions that are not coupled with the application 
specific details. As a result, many of these assumed 
vulnerabilities are theoretical in nature without any 
consideration to application-specific threats and 
requirements.  
Apart form the lack of application specific objectives, 
the current security mechanisms for WSNs have other 
problems too. Although, some of the existing security 
solutions for defense against outsider attacks by key 
management schemes [2, 3, 6, 24, 25] and secure node-
to-node communication mechanisms [24, 26] are quite 
effective, these mechanisms break down even if a single 
legitimate node in the network is compromised [18]. 
Presence of a few compromised nodes can pose severe 
security threats in a WSN, as these nodes can launch 
different types of attacks e.g., dropping of legitimate 
reports, injection of bogus sensing reports, 
advertisement of inconsistent routing information, 
eavesdropping on in-network communication using 
exposed keys, etc. Such disruption by an insider attack 
can be very detrimental to the overall objective and 
mission of the WSN. Thus security counter-measures 
against each type of such attacks is very much in 
demand.  
In the past few years, many cryptography-based security 
designs have been proposed for WSNs. Cryptography 
provides a number of efficient mechanisms for 
implementing data confidentiality, data integrity, node 
authentication, secure routing and access control in 
different types of networks. While these techniques are 
very useful in building secure WSNs, they are not 
sufficient to address the security threats posed by 
compromised and faulty sensors [18]. This is because 
any compromised or faulty node possesses the 
cryptographic key by virtue of being a legitimate 
member of the network, and thus, it is allowed to 
participate in the network activities in the same way as 
other nodes in the network. As cryptographic 
mechanisms are not sufficient to address threats posed 
by compromised and faulty sensor nodes, a more 
sophisticated technique is needed to fully address the 
problem. 
Some propositions already exist in the literature for 
addressing the threats posed by compromised and faulty 
nodes in WSNs [19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. These mechanisms 
mainly focus on utilization of the redundancy in a WSN 
to improve its resilience against attacks. These 
techniques generally involve introduction of a threshold 
property in their designs to have robustness against a 
certain threshold (maximum) number of compromised 
and faulty nodes. However, in practice, these passive 
approaches are not very effective since the designed 
threshold parameter may deviate significantly from the 
real-world scenario.  
To systematically address the problem of insider attack, 
this paper presents a unified proactive approach towards 
design of a defense mechanism against different types 
of attacks in a WSN. The proposed framework is based 
on a proactive data security mechanism that consists of 
two broad modules: (i) misbehavior characterization and 
monitoring, and (ii) trust management. While the first 
module categorizes different types of misbehavior of 
nodes and defines a set of monitoring criteria for each of 
these misbehaviors, the second module develops a trust 
management framework that evaluates the detection 
results of the first module and updates a reputation table 
in each sensor node. The communication among the 
sensors is based on their reputation records. The nodes 
having reputation values lower than a threshold are not 
allowed to participate in network activities.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents some related work on cryptography-based 
security mechanisms for WSNs. In Section 3, different 
security vulnerabilities of WSNs are discussed and the 
limitations of the currently existing mechanisms are 
identified.  The proposed security scheme is described 
in Section 4 and Section 5. Section 4 presents 
misbehavior classification and handling module of the 
scheme. Section 5 describes the design principles of the 
trust management component. Section 6 presents some 
experimental results and the plan for further 
experiments. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Related Work 
 
Most of the currently existing security schemes for 
WSNs are based on cryptographic mechanisms. In this 
section, some of these schemes are described briefly.  
Eshenauer and Gligor [2] have proposed a random key 
pre-distribution scheme to establish keys between 
sensor nodes. In this scheme, each sensor node of a 
WSN receives a random subset of keys from a key pool 
before the deployment of the network. Any pair of 
nodes which are able to find one common key within 
their respective key subsets can use that key as a shared 
secret to initiate communication between them.  
Chan, Perrig and Song [3] have proposed three models 
for pairwise key pre-distribution in a WSN. The first 
model is based on a q- composite scheme that extends 
Eschenaeuer’s scheme by imposing an additional 
constraint. This constraint requires that for any two 
nodes to form a secure channel between them, they must 
have q common keys between them. The second model 
involves a multi-path key reinforcement scheme that 
offers increased security against an adversary by 
performing key updates across multiple paths. The third 
model features a random-pairwise key scheme which 
ensures security of the network even in presence of a 
certain threshold number of compromised nodes.  
Blom [4] has proposed a key pre-distribution scheme 
that enables any pair of nodes in the network to generate 
a secret pairwise key between them. Du and Deng [29] 
have described a scheme that offers improved network 
resilience by combining Blom’s scheme with the 
scheme proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor.  
Blundo et al [5] have described some schemes of key 
management for WSNs. These schemes allow any 
group of n network nodes to compute a common key. 
This key is perfectly secret and secure against any 
collusion attempt by any t other nodes in the networks.  
Liu and Ning [6] have presented a framework for 
pairwise key establishment based on polynomial key 
pre-distribution protocol proposed by Blundo et al  [5] 
and the probabilistic key distribution of  Chan, Perrig 
and Song [3]. They have further developed two novel 
pairwise key pre-distribution schemes- (i) random 
subset assignment and (ii) grid-based key pre-
distribution scheme. 
Law, Etalle, and Hartel [7] have investigated the issues 
related to group-wise pre-deployed keying and secret 
sharing of pre-deployed keying. They have proposed a 
group-wise scheme called ‘k-secure t-limited group-
wise pre-deployed keying’ where k denotes the number 
of attacker groups and t denotes the maximum number 
of communication groups. As this scheme is based on 
Blundo’s key distribution scheme, it is secure from 
information theoretic point of view. The authors have 
also proposed a secret sharing scheme of pre-deployed 
keys known as private-key sharing and pre-deployed 
keying. 
 
3.  Limitations of the Current Schemes 
 
The associated threats and vulnerabilities of a WSN are 
dependent on its application. As a consequence, WSN 
security design and analysis must be sensitive to its 
application context. Otherwise, the assumptions made 
on the organization of the WSN and the corresponding 
threats may become inconsistent with the problem 
domain. This will obviously lead to design of 
mechanisms that attempt to address unrealistic 
problems. Unfortunately, most of the current security 
solutions for WSNs suffer from this drawback. The 
design of a security scheme for a WSN should 
incorporate the security context that is not merely a 
precise technical specification; rather it is a set of 
security-related factors that narrow down the WSN 
design space to a region consistent with its application 
and environmental contexts. 
Apart from the above generic limitations, there are other 
shortcomings with the current security schemes. Most 
of these schemes are based on cryptographic techniques, 
and therefore, these schemes are not capable of ensuring 
data security in WSNs. We will now illustrate this with 
the help of an example. Let us consider a tactical 
battlefield scenario where a WSN is deployed to provide 
dynamic location information of the adversary soldiers 
to the legitimate users (soldiers) of the network. We 
assume that some of the sensors in the network are 
compromised and these compromised nodes are under 
the complete control of the adversary soldiers. The 
cryptographic mechanisms are supposed to be already 
deployed in the WSN. We now illustrate three attacks 
that cannot be addressed by cryptographic primitives. 
(i) Attacks on data confidentiality: For confidentiality of 
sensitive data, it is required that no adversary should be 
able to access network data even if he is able to 
compromise some nodes in the network. However, in 
the tactical battlefield scenario, a compromised node 
may initiate a query asking for the location of a 
legitimate soldier and send this information to an 
adversary soldier. Since the query sent by the 
compromised node is authenticated with the 
cryptographic key, cryptographic mechanisms cannot 
prevent this attack on data confidentiality. 
(ii) Attacks on data authenticity: The network should 
allow only authenticated nodes to participate in the 
network activities. Thus only authentic data that covey 
the actual status of the environment should be 
communicated and processed by the network nodes. 
Spurious data from compromised and faulty nodes 
should be either prohibited from being injected in the 
network or filtered out after they are received by the 
network nodes. However, in the example scenario, a 
compromised or faulty node is freely allowed to send 
false information in reply to a query of a legitimate 
soldier, thereby completely misleading the latter.  
Cryptographic mechanisms cannot prevent this attack as 
the compromised nodes possess the cryptographic key 
and these nodes are authenticated members of the 
network. Thus messages sent by these nodes are also 
assumed to be authentic messages. A few attack-
resilient approaches have been proposed to mitigate this 
attack. These mechanisms usually introduce a threshold 
property in their designs and thus gain robustness 
against a certain maximum number of compromised and 
faulty nodes. For instance, in order to prevent 
compromised nodes from reporting false alarm to a sink 
node, observations from multiple sensors (say t) may be 
utilized. As long as there are not more than t 
compromised nodes in the network, the event report will 
be correct. However, the effectiveness of these 
approaches is doubtful in practical situations where the 
predefined threshold may be significantly different from 
the real scenario in the network. 
(iii) Attacks on data availability: Critical information in 
the network should be always available on demand to 
any legitimate user (soldier). On the other hand, an 
adversary should not be allowed to access any critical 
information in the network. An attack on data 
availability will try to make critical data not available to 
the legitimate users in the network. In the example 
scenario, a compromised node may intentionally drop 
an alarm message sent by a legitimate node in the 
network without forwarding it to its neighbors. This is 
an attack on data availability as the legitimate nodes in 
the network will not receive the alert message resulting 
in a disaster. It is quite clear that cryptographic 
mechanisms are not capable to defend against this attack 
too. 
Above examples illustrate that cryptography-based 
techniques are not sufficient to address security threats 
posed by compromised and faulty nodes in WSNs. A 
more proactive approach is needed where compromised 
and faulty nodes are promptly identified and prevented 
from participating in network activities. 
 
3.1 WSN vulnerabilities and their impact on design 
 
There are many characteristic features of WSNs that 
make these networks particularly vulnerable to different 
types of attacks. From an attacker’s perspective, the 
opportunity for a particular type of attack is essentially 
the ease or difficulty in launching that attack. The 
opportunity, when combined with the benefit, can be 
used to define cost-benefit ratios for different types of 
attacks. Because of their data-driven nature and large 
number of possible threats, WSNs are vulnerable to 
different types of attacks. Some of them are as follows: 
(i) Physical attack on the sensors: The in-situ nature of 
WSNs requires that sensors be integrated with the 
environment they are monitoring. As a result, the 
network may be physically vulnerable depending on the 
nature and extent of the sensor field. Access to the 
sensors can be used to physically destroy them, or to 
capture and subvert them to collect confidential data or 
to make an attempt in launching insider attack on the 
network. 
(ii) Attack on the wireless channel: In addition to 
physical vulnerability of sensors, attackers may have 
access to anything transmitted over the wireless channel 
due to broadcast nature of the channel. Further, 
attackers can launch an outsider attack by injecting their 
packets to cause interference with legitimate packet 
transmission in the network. 
(iii) Attack on coordination and self-configuration:  For 
proper functioning and operation, the nodes in a WSN 
require coordination among them and self-configuration 
of the network via distributed protocols with localized 
interactions [8]. In many applications, WSNs heavily 
rely on coordinated services such as routing, 
localization, time synchronization, and in-network data 
processing for self-configuration and collaborative 
processing of data. Unfortunately, these services present 
unique opportunities of attacks which are absent in 
conventional networks. For example, compromised 
nodes can claim a false proximity to the sink node to 
attract packets from other nodes, considerably increase 
the clock skew to disrupt coordinated network 
operations such as sleep scheduling, and inject false 
data to reduce the accuracy of sensing. These attacks on 
fundamental coordination and self-configuration 
functions can be detrimental to the sensor network.  
(iv) Attacks due to visibility of the network: A good 
understanding of the span and structure of the network 
opens up risks for more precise and effective attacks. 
The information about the network such as expected 
mission lifetime, deployment of the nodes, 
communication among the nodes and access to the 
sensor field can provide crucial data to a potential 
attacker. Beyond mere detection of the presence of a 
network, detection of its structure, topology and other 
communication pattern among the nodes can invite 
more directed attacks, e.g., targeted attack on the base 
station or nodes which are in the vicinity of the attacker.  
A good range of design choices for WSNs are available 
in terms of the types of sensors and their capabilities, 
sensor density and distribution, and application 
software. Typically, the design of these elements is 
driven by cost, energy-efficiency and application-level 
performance such as the coverage or accuracy. 
In applications with high attacker motivation, the WSN 
design should make a trade off between cost and 
network performance to keep vulnerabilities at 
acceptable levels. At the physical level, this translates 
into using more expensive and secure sensors, or 
deploying more sensors to introduce redundancy or 
tolerance against a possible attack. For example, the 
network can be better protected by deploying multiple 
base stations when the attacker’s motivation for 
attacking a single base station is expected to be high. 
These extra capabilities may be introduced or tasked 
non-uniformly depending on the application; for 
example, more expensive and secure sensors may be 
delegated with critical roles in underlying services or 
may be used in less secure areas of the network. 
In terms of protocols, services, and application software, 
the tradeoff between security and performance is more 
explicit. Vulnerabilities arise especially in the setup of 
critical services such as routing. Protocols such as 
geographic routing expose the location of the 
destination in each packet, which could in turn, invite 
attacks on critical points of the infrastructure. The use of 
encryption can improve confidentiality at the cost of 
energy and computational resources; the size of the 
encryption key makes this a tunable tradeoff. In 
addition, to protect the structure of the network, 
anomaly and intrusion detection as well as trust 
management approaches should be employed. They 
enable detection of attacks and tolerating them, if 
possible, by isolating misbehaving nodes. Using per-
hop encryption facilitates in-network data processing 
but may make the network vulnerable to attacks 
launched by a group of compromised nodes. In critical 
applications, end-to-end encryption may be used, to 
achieve higher level security. However, it will not be 
energy-efficient as in-network processing will not be 
possible with end-to-end encryption in place. 
 
4.  The Proposed Security Mechanism 
 
In this section, we describe the proposed security 
mechanism for a WSN. First we present the network 
model and the security model where we list down 
different assumptions about the networks and its 
applications. Then we discuss different types of 
misbehavior exhibited by a faulty or compromised 
sensor node. Finally, some rules are presented for 
handling different types of compromised nodes.  
 
4.1 Network model and system security model 
 
Network Model: We consider a WSN with a large 
number of uniformly distributed static sensors that 
monitors a vast terrain. The WSN may be deployed by 
techniques such as aerial scattering. Following 
assumptions are made about the network: (i) after 
deployment, each node has a localization mechanism by 
which it can get an idea about its authentic geographic 
location. (ii) the WSN is densely connected so that it 
can support fine-grained collaborative sensing and 
computing even in the event of node and link failures, 
(iii) multiple users may put query for network 
information simultaneously into the network, (iv) the 
deployed sensor nodes are not tamper-resistant and have 
limited communication range, (v) wireless links in the 
network are symmetric, (vi) for detection of any event 
or to resolve a user query, a collaborative participation 
of multiple sensors is possible. 
Security Model: From security perspective, following 
assumptions about the network are made: (i) 
cryptography-based mechanisms are already deployed 
in the network. Thus, every sensor can authenticate 
itself to its neighbors by the cryptographic key it 
possesses, (ii) at the time of network bootstrapping, 
there are no compromised or faulty nodes in the 
network, (iii) during network operation an adversary can 
physically compromise a few number of sensors and 
gain full control on them. It is not possible for any 
legitimate sensor nodes in the network to detect and 
understand the communication of messages between the 
compromised nodes and the adversary.  
In the proposed security framework, we assume that the 
nodes may fail due to a number of events such as radio 
failure, sensing function error, system crash etc. Since 
failed nodes also lead to generation of wrong (bogus) 
data, their presence is equally detrimental to the 
network functioning. Moreover, Byzantine failures of 
nodes may result in persistent, transient or probabilistic 
failure pattern which will be impossible to detect by a 
simple deterministic mechanism.  
Finally, the adversary is assumed to be sophisticated 
and is driven by two main objectives: 
(i) Benefit form data: The adversary wants to gain 
access to the sensitive data being monitored or relayed 
in the network. Thus, the goal of the attacker is to have 
an access to the data being carried. 
(ii) Mission interference: The adversary wants to 
interfere with the mission of the WSN. In this case, the 
data inside the WSN is not necessarily of interest to the 
attacker. Instead, he wants to compromise the network’s 
ability to function by injecting spurious data or by 
disrupting a set of nodes in the network.  Disrupting the 
availability of the network is also one of the objectives 
of the adversary.  
 
4.2 Types of misbehavior of nodes  
 
The nodes in the network may exhibit different types of 
misbehavior due to insider attack or random failure. The 
insider attacks can be classified into four broad types: 
(i) data forwarding related, (ii) data generation related, 
(iii) routing related, and (iv) miscellaneous. Different 
types of data forwarding attack are: message delay 
attack, selective forwarding attack, message alteration 
attack, message replay attack, sinkhole attack, message 
collision attack etc. Data generation related attack 
includes spurious data injection attack, bogus query 
attack, report disruption attack etc. Routing related 
attack involves: hello flood attack, wormhole attack, 
spurious routing information attack, Sybil attack etc.   
Finally, Byzantine attack, node replication attack, node 
relocation attack etc. fall under miscellaneous types of 
insider attack. In Byzantine attack, a malicious node 
intermittently acts in proper way. 
After having identified different types of insider attack 
in a WSN, we make the following general observations: 
• Networks having cryptographic mechanisms already 
in place will be able to detect compromised nodes as 
these nodes will fail in authentication. These nodes 
will not be able to process and forward the packets 
arriving at them as they do not have the key, 
resulting in packet dropping. This packet dropping 
will be observed by the neighbour nodes and 
subsequently the compromised nodes will be 
identified. 
• In case of data forwarding related attack, it will be 
more difficult to detect compromised nodes that 
selectively or randomly drop packets. The 
compromised nodes may act in collusion and drop 
packets multiple hops away, making a localized 
detection algorithm completely ineffective. This 
type of attack will not be possible, however, if the 
application requires end-to-end acknowledgment. 
• A compromised node may occasionally report 
spurious sensed result to cheat its neighbors in a 
collaborative aggregation problem. However, the 
sensing results within a neighbourhood should not 
vary significantly and the nodes with significantly 
different sensing results should be suspected.  
• Generally, it is very difficult to detect compromised 
nodes that launch message collision attack. 
However, a sensor does have the ability to detect 
abnormally high rate of collision by comparing its 
packet delivery ratio with its neighbors and their 
location information. 
• A Byzantine attack compromises software platform 
of a sensor node by running some malicious code. 
Such an attack can be detected by using code 
attestation techniques implemented in the nodes [9].  
In addition to the compromised nodes, the network may 
also have faulty nodes due to node failure. Failure of 
nodes may lead to one or more of the following events: 
(i) random message alteration, (ii) random message 
broadcast, (iii) sensing function error, and (iv) random 
packet dropping. However, these events pose the same 
security threats as the compromised nodes. 
 
4.3 Rules for handling different misbehavior 
 
Any attack on a WSN manifests itself in terms of 
occurrence of certain events. In this section, we 
formulate different rules for the proposed security 
schemes and also identify the events that will trigger 
application of these rules. 
Message acknowledgment rule: In the proposed scheme, 
any unacknowledged message is treated as an evidence 
of an attack or a failure of the next-hop neighbor node, 
although the message packet might have been dropped 
by a sensor that is multiple hops away from the source 
node. To effectively handle the uncertainty associated 
with this, three possible cases are identified and dealt 
with in different manner. These cases are: (i) the 
acknowledgment successfully reaches the source node, 
(ii) the next-hop node of the source node has really 
forwarded the message but the acknowledgment has not 
reached the source node before the expiry of the timer, 
(iii) the next-hop has not forwarded the message and 
thus the acknowledgment would never reach the source.  
Authentication failure rule: An authentication failure is 
considered as an evidence of an attack or node failure. 
The proposed scheme distinguishes between end-to-end 
and hop-wise authentication failures. Only hop-wise 
authentication failure is taken as an evidence of attack. 
Data validation rule: It is assumed that the sensing 
results of a set of sensors in the same neighborhood 
follow a normal distribution. Thus if a node reports 
result that significantly deviates from the results of its 
neighbor nodes, it may be suspected to have been 
compromised or failed. The result consistency check is 
usually application specific, and the data abnormality 
may be detected given the context of the application.  
Traffic awareness rule: The underlying MAC protocol 
in the WSN is assumed to be of ‘collision avoidance’ 
type. It is also assumed that the packet generation/relay 
actions of a sensor node can be sensed and estimated by 
its neighbor nodes. Any unexpected packet 
generation/relay by a node is thus considered as a sign 
of an attack or node failure. 
Packet delivery rule: The packet delivery ratio of a node 
is defined as the ratio of the number of packets that are 
successfully delivered to a destination node to the 
number of packets that have been sent by the sender. In 
the proposed scheme, if a sensor node finds that its 
packet delivery ratio is below a threshold value, it treats 
this as a sign of message collision attack or a possible 
node failure and sends an alarm message to its 
neighbors. The threshold value of the packet delivery 
ratio is determined based on the quality of wireless 
links, and the probability of packet loss due to normal 
collision in the network. In contrast to all the previous 
rules, this is a self-evaluation rule where a sensor node 
evaluates itself rather than evaluating its neighbors.  
Memory consistency rule: The memory status of a 
sensor node should be consistent and should maintain 
integrity. Any abnormal change in code size is a sign of 
an attack or a hardware failure. 
In-situ rule: The proposed mechanism assumes a static 
WSN where every node keeps its location constant after 
the network deployment. Therefore, any location change 
of a node is a sign of a possible attack. 
 
 4.4 Behavior monitoring 
 
Each sensor node is assumed to be operating in 
promiscuous mode and monitoring the packet 
forwarding activities of each of its neighbour nodes. For 
this purpose, each node maintains a buffer and 
randomly copies packets to it and checks whether these 
packets are forwarded by its neighbor nodes or dropped. 
Specifically the following activities are monitored by 
each node: 
Packet forwarding behaviour:  In the proposed 
mechanism, an algorithm is invoked periodically that 
senses the channel and compares ongoing data traffic 
with the recorded routing and MAC messages to detect 
any possible anomaly. In addition to this, timer and 
explicit acknowledgment mechanisms are used to detect 
any possible packet drop and packet duplication 
attempt. 
Time-space-data consistency: In the proposed 
mechanism, the data validation information is obtained 
from the application modules of the neighbor nodes of a 
sensor. As the notion of data validation is application-
specific, different data validation algorithms are 
designed for different applications. 
Traffic-related behavior: It is assumed that the behavior 
of each neighbor nodes of a sensor with respect to 
message generation, relay, and duty cycle (sleep 
schedule) is possible to be estimated clearly from the 
context of the application. This is a realistic assumption 
in view of different statistical estimation techniques 
available for this purpose. 
Cryptographic failures: The mechanism has the 
provision of capturing and storing every event of failure 
raised by the underlying cryptographic module. These 
events are signs of attacks or node failures in the 
network. 
Self-status: Every node keeps track of its own packet 
delivery ratio, its memory status in real time, and its 
location information by some localization technique to 
identify any possible attack on it by an adversary. 
This detailed set of behavior monitoring criteria 
provides the proposed security mechanism the 
capability to effectively detect any insider attack and 
presence of any failed nodes in the network. The design 
goal behind the formulation of such criteria is to keep 
monitoring activity of each individual sensor 
independent of each other. Each sensor node thus 
monitors its own neighbourhood and makes its own 
decision independent of the observation being made by 
its neighbors. This local detection algorithm avoids 
complexities of collaborative monitoring mechanisms 
and involves much less computation. However, due to 
limited local information available in the nodes, this 
local monitoring scheme will lead to some false 
positives- situations where the mechanism will raise 
alarm but actually there is no real attack or node failure. 
On the other hand, due to its simplicity, it will consume 
less power in the sensor nodes and will have less 
communication overhead compared to a collaborative 
monitoring mechanism. Moreover, the proposed 
mechanism follows a much simpler decision fusion and 
aggregation approach that is quite efficient and accurate 
in terms of attack detection capability. This is described 
in detail in the next section. 
 
5.  Trust Management Framework 
 
As mentioned in Section 1, the proposed security 
mechanism has two broad modules- (i) misbehavior 
characterization and behavior modeling, (ii) trust 
management. The first module has been described in 
detail in Section 4. In this section, we present a 
description of the trust management module. Figure 1 
describes the high-level architecture of the trust 
management module. The watchdog component enables 
each node to operate in promiscuous mode and collect 
first-hand information about the activities of each of its 
neighbors. The reputation and trust value of each node 
is computed on the basis of these observations. Based 
on these computed trust values, a sensor node’s strategy 
for other node is determined. If the trust value is above a 
pre-determined threshold, then the strategy is to 
cooperate with the node otherwise not. If need arises, 
the trust management module of a node generates alert 
messages and broadcasts them in the network so that all 
the legitimate nodes in the network become aware about 
the presence of any compromised node in the network. 
In computation of the reputation and trust metrics, 
higher weight is given to recent observations. Also a 
node with a higher reputation gets higher weight in its 
vote when a cooperative detection algorithm is invoked 
as discussed later in this section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Architecture of the trust management module 
 
5.1 Design principles of trust framework 
  
The proposed trust management scheme is based on 
computation of trust and reputation metrics for the 
nodes in a WSN. The application of trust and 
reputation-based systems is quite common in peer-to-
peer computing and mobile ad hoc networks. An 
extensive research has been done on these areas over the 
period of last five years [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. In the 
following, we present the major design policies of the 
trust management mechanism of the proposed scheme.  
Policy1: During the network bootstrapping and 
initialization phase, each sensor node has the highest 
level of trust. Therefore, each node can fully trust all of 
its neighbors till it encounters experiences through 
interaction in the network which may reduce the initial 
trust value depending on the experience.  
The rationale for the assumption of all the nodes being 
equally trustworthy is due to that fact that these nodes 
are all deployed and scattered by the same trusted entity. 
Therefore, for a certain period of time at the initial 
period, all the nodes can be assumed to be good before 
some of them become faulty or compromised.   
Policy 2: The trust system is based on both good and 
bad experiences encountered. Thus, both positive and 
negative experiences are taken into account for 
computation of trust and reputation metrics of a node. 
These experiences are based on direct observations 
only.  
It is essential that both positive and negative 
experiences are taken into account for computation of a 
combined trust metric. Use of only positive information 
may lead to false-praise attack by a group of colluding 
sensors and thereby increasing their presence in terms of 
more number of compromised nodes. On the other 
hand, use of only negative information will lead to 
potential bad-mouthing attack where a group of 
colluding malicious nodes may send wrong information 
about a really good node thereby reducing its trust value 
and ultimately isolating it from the network. Thus, in 
the proposed scheme, both types of information are used 
for computation of reputation metric for a node. 
Moreover, to reduce the complexity of reputation 
computation, each sensor node maintains the reputation 
Watchdog Reputation Trust Behavior 
and trust information for its neighbor nodes only, and 
establishes a localized store of trust and reputation 
information. 
Policy 3: When the reputation value of a sensor node 
drops below a pre-determined threshold, the reputation 
fading mechanism is disabled. 
When the reputation value of a sensor node falls below 
a pre-determined threshold (a design parameter) in one 
or more of its neighbors, a voting algorithm is invoked 
(Policy 4). If the suspected node is identified to be 
really compromised or faulty, it is isolated and not 
allowed to participate further in any network activities. 
In some reputation systems for ad hoc networks, 
reputation fading mechanism is in place [12, 13, 15]. In 
such cases, a node that is isolated from the network due 
to low trust value is allowed after a certain period, when 
its reputation value is restored to a value higher than the 
minimum threshold due to reputation redemption. 
However, the proposed trust mechanism for WSNs does 
not employ reputation fading as sensor random failures 
are less frequent events. Thus, once the reputation value 
of a node falls below a threshold, it is highly likely that 
the node is compromised or has failed in hardware. In 
either case, the node should not be allowed to join the 
network further as there is no sensor recovery 
mechanism in place.   
Policy 4: A suspected sensor node is isolated from the 
network based on the outcome of a voting algorithm 
among the neighbor nodes of the suspected node.  
When a node is suspected to be malicious as its 
reputation value has fallen below a threshold in one or 
more of its neighbors, the neighbors generate alarms 
and broadcast them. However, to prevent any possible 
attempt by a group of colluding nodes to isolate an 
honest node, a majority voting algorithm is invoked in 
the neighbourhood of the suspected node. The suspected 
node is isolated only if the majority of the neighbors 
agree that the suspected node is to be isolated based on 
the trust information maintained by them about the 
suspected node. This algorithm will work fine as along 
as the majority of the nodes in any neighbourhood are 
honest (i.e., not compromised).  
 
5.2 Trust management scheme 
 
Any currently existing trust and reputation systems can 
be extended to accommodate the design principles 
described in Section 5.1. Therefore, details regarding 
trust metrics and reputation computation is avoided 
here. Instead, the procedure of building the trust 
management scheme for the proposed mechanism is 
discussed in a rather generic way. 
Computation of trust values: In the proposed system, 
the trust management module invokes itself 
automatically after the deployment of the WSN. Each 
sensor constructs a reputation table corresponding to 
each of its neighbors and also maintains two counters 
one for positive and the other for negative experiences 
for each neighbor with which it has interacted. Initially 
the trust values for all sensors are assigned to the 
maximum level as mentioned in Section 5.1.  
Since the basic functions of the nodes in a WSN are 
sensing, processing, reporting and forwarding of data, 
each sensor is allowed to accumulate its trust value by 
legitimately participating in these activities. Thus, for 
example, each successful completion of each of these 
activities will increase the positive counter for a node by 
1, which in turn, will increase the trust level and hence 
the reputation value of the node. In some applications, 
the value or significance of the activity is context-based, 
and thus the increase in the positive counter is activity-
dependent. In peer-to-peer networks and mobile ad hoc 
networks, certain incentives (credit) are given to nodes 
that answer to the queries on the reputation values of 
other nodes [15]. However, in sensor networks, as all 
the sensors belong to the same interest group, 
responding to the reputation queries is a mandatory 
responsibility. Accordingly, sensors in the proposed 
scheme do not increase the positive counters for 
cooperative participation of the neighbors. On the other 
hand, the negative counter is increased for each bad 
encounter that a node experiences with any of its 
neighbors.    
Based on the values of both the positive and negative 
counters, the reputation value of a sensor is computed 
and updated accordingly. Use of beta-distribution is 
very popular in this regard [16, 17]. To defend against 
more advanced attacks, e.g., strategic dynamic 
personality attacks where a group of malicious node 
first builds up a good reputation value and then starts 
misusing it by getting involved in malicious activities 
till their reputation values just reach the minimum 
threshold, and again starts building the reputation, more 
refined trust metrics  like TrustGuard [12] can be 
employed. Invariably there will be trade-off between the 
computation and communication cost and the accuracy 
of evaluating the trust values of sensors.  
In certain cases, it is possible that the trust value of a 
sensor is set directly to a value, instead of being 
computed from the trust metrics. For example, if a node 
has made violation of the memory consistency rule or 
in-situ rules (Section 4.3), every node in its 
neighbourhood will set the its reputation value to 0 and 
isolate it from the network.   
In case of violation of packet delivery rule (Section 4.3), 
the node that first detects the violation will send an alert 
message to all the neighbors of the suspected node and 
the sink node. A higher level intrusion detection action 
can be taken to identify the source of the attack, because 
it is usually impossible for a sensor node to detect a 
malicious neighbor without a multi-layer detection 
mechanism. This is especially true when the message 
collision attack (jamming attack) happens below the 
network layer (i.e., at MAC or physical layer). 
Isolation of malicious sensors: A very robust and 
efficient mechanism is employed for isolation of sensor 
nodes that are identified to be compromised or faulty. 
The mechanism involves invocation of a majority 
voting algorithm in the neighborhood of the suspected 
sensor as follows. Suppose that a sensor detects that one 
of its neighbor, say R is having its reputation value 
below a pre-determined threshold. The node 
immediately generates an alert message and broadcasts 
it to all the neighbors of R. The neighbors involve 
themselves in a voting algorithm where all the 
neighbors declare their reputation values for R. If the 
majority of the neighbors observe that the reputation 
value of R is below the threshold then R is isolated from 
the network and a message to that effect is broadcast in 
the neighborhood of R. The proposed scheme is thus 
based on local monitoring of the individual nodes and 
does not involve computationally complex collaborative 
monitoring. It has also a very low message overhead. 
On-demand querying trust values of remote sensors: As 
the reputation information in the proposed scheme are 
maintained in the neighborhood, there can be a potential 
problem when a node needs to communicate to a remote 
node that is multiple hops away from it. Thus, when a 
sensor node receives a query from a remote node what 
should it do? How does it know whether it should 
communicate with that node or not? In such cases, the 
receiver node indirectly judges the trustworthiness of 
the sender on-the-fly. Since each sensor has reputation 
knowledge about its neighbors only, the reputation of 
the remote node is computed following a different 
approach known as ‘distance-aware trustworthy route 
approach. This approach first estimates the number of 
hops between the sender (remote) node and the receiver 
(local) node based on their location information.   Then 
the receiver node tries to find at least one path with the 
same number of hops to reach the sender node. Each 
pair of consecutive nodes along that route should have a 
minimum threshold mutual trust value. If such a route 
can be successfully found, then the sender node is 
assumed to be trustworthy and the receiver node starts 
sending the response to the query.    
 
6.  Experiments and Results 
 
As the first step of validation of the proposed security 
mechanism, we have implemented the cryptographic 
framework for message communication between the 
sensor nodes and evaluated its performance.  Due to 
hardware constraints of the sensor nodes, we have 
chosen shared-key cryptography as it is computationally 
less expensive.  
The authentication protocol for the sensor nodes is 
based on an 8-byte message authentication code (MAC) 
included in every packet sent by a sensor to the base 
station. The MAC is computed based on RC5 
encryption algorithm. As each sensor has its own shared 
key with the base station, the base station can verify the 
authenticity of a message by computing the MAC of the 
message and comparing it with the MAC on the packet.  
The confidentiality in message communication is also 
achieved by running RC5 in output-feedback mode 
(OFB). For this purpose, a sensor node uses its secret 
key and some initialization vector (IV) to calculate a 
pad. The plaintext is then XORed with the pad to 
produce the cipher text. OFB is particularly suitable in 
bandwidth-constrained wireless links since ciphertext is 
of the same size as the plaintext.  
For every packet sent to the base station, the actual 
payload is encrypted. The combined MAC is computed 
based on the encrypted payload, the application handler 
ID, sequence number and source ID. This MAC 
provides the authentication of the message. The 
confidentiality and authentication between base station 
and the sensor nodes establishes a secure 
communication channel between the sensors and the 
base station. As a packet is only 30 bytes long, a typical 
PC (being used as the base station) with Pentium IV, 
1024 MB RAM, 2 GHz clock speed, can authenticate 
1.27 million packets per second. It can also handle 
encryption for 1.05 million packets per second. This 
clearly shows that cryptographic operations will not 
pose any scalability bottleneck. Instead, key lookup and 
key set up and storage of expanded keys (which 
occupies 72 bytes per key) will be. We have simulated 
the sensor nodes by SensorSim extension of network 
simulator NS2. Each simulated sensor has 8kb of flash 
memory, 4MHz 8-bit processor and a 900 MHz radio 
interface. With radio bandwidth of 10 Kbps, each sensor 
was found to be able to encrypt and authenticate every 
message it received.  In fact the constraining factor is 
not the computation power but the memory 
requirement. In fact, the storage of key and buffering of 
encryption and MAC take 200 bytes out of 512 bytes of 
available RAM. 
Having studied the performance of the cryptographic 
mechanisms in the sensor network, we plan to take up 
the performance evaluation of the reputation and trust 
module of the proposed scheme. For computation of the 
trust function we plan to consider two extreme cases: (i) 
when a neighbor node j of a node i cooperates fully with 
it and forwards all the packets it receives from i, and (ii) 
when the node j is malicious and drops all the packets 
that it receives from node i. After studying the 
behaviour of the trust function under these two extreme 
conditions, we plan to reduce the degree of 
maliciousness of the node j and gradually reduce its 
packet dropping rate and study the change pattern of the 
trust function with different rates of packet drop. The 
convergence of the trust and reputation-related 
information and associated time for this will be another 
interesting observation for study. Although the scheme 
is based on both positive and negative information and 
thus can be assumed to be immune to false-praise attack 
and bad-mouthing attack, the resilience of the scheme 
against such attacks will also be studied.  
   
7.  Conclusion 
 
Wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to numerous 
security threats that can endanger their proper 
functioning. Security support in WSNs is challenging 
due to limited energy, communication bandwidth, and 
computational power of the sensor nodes. Given the 
diversity of WSN applications and possibly different 
security requirements, a proactive, application-driven 
approach is needed for making these networks secure. 
In this paper, we have illustrated that cryptographic 
solutions are inadequate to tackle the security threats 
posed by compromised and faulty nodes in WSNs and 
have proposed a more complete solution based on 
misbehavior classification, behaviour monitoring and 
trust management. The proposed scheme is ideally 
suited for resource-constrained WSNs as it involves 
minimum computation and communication overhead. 
The basic cryptographic framework required for this 
scheme has been implemented on a network simulator 
and its performance has been evaluated. The results 
obtained so far have shown the feasibility and 
effectiveness of the proposed scheme. As a future scope 
of work, we plan to implement the trust management 
framework and evaluate its performance. For this 
purpose, the evaluation parameters are already 
identified. 
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